Panel 1:
Robotic Speech and the First Amendment
Moderator: Professor Gregory Silverman
Panelists: Bruce E. H. Johnson, Helen Norton, and David Skover
Silverman: We kick off today’s symposium with a panel on Robotic
Speech and the First Amendment. The focus of this first panel is the soonto-be-published book by Professors Skover and Collins. Professor David
Skover is the Fredric C. Tausend Professor of Law here at Seattle
University, and he will represent the authors on this morning’s panel. The
book is Robotica.1 The first half of the book lays out an argument
extending First Amendment protection to robotic speech. The second half
of the book has five commentators who give their reactions to the first half,
followed by the response of Professors Skover and Collins to the
commentators. Our format this morning is going to mirror the structure of
the book. I will begin by offering my own summary of the argument set
out by Professors Skover and Collins. That will be followed by two of the
five commentators here today, Attorney Johnson and Professor Norton.
And then Professor Skover will offer his response to the two
commentators.
Attorney Bruce Johnson is one of the nation’s leading First
Amendment litigators. He is a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine here in
Seattle. Professor Helen Norton holds the Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in
Constitutional Law at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Among her
many works she has recently written an article entitled, Siri-ously? Free
Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence.2
The central insight and premise from which Professors Skover and
Collins begin is that any new and effective technology of communication
transforms society and the law by changing the calculus of its values and
1. RONALD L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
2. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 (2016).
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recalibrating its notions of harm.3 The buttress that supports his claim in
the early part of the book was the brief social history of several disruptive
technologies of communication: scribal writing, the printing press, radio,
television, the computer, and the internet. From the perspective of this
history, they recognize, in the present, the emergence of a new, disruptive
communications media: robotic communication—communication
mediated by robots. In robotic communication, robots either communicate
directly with human beings or act as proxies for human beings when they
communicate with other robots. For example, on the Internet of Things,
an intelligent refrigerator tells us that we are low on eggs and then, on our
behalf, communicates with a robot situated on the supermarket server. So,
we have both forms of robotic communication in that example.
After identifying robotic communication as a new medium of
communication, Professors Skover and Collins asked whether First
Amendment coverage given to traditional forms of speech should be
extended to the data processed and transmitted by robots. To answer this
question, they distinguished robotic communications addressed to humans
on the one hand and those transmitted to other robots on the other.
Regarding robotic communications addressed to humans, they argue that
First Amendment law protects words, text, images, sounds, and data
because of its expressive meaning. Drawing on the work of reader
response and reception theorists who claim that the meaning of a text
arises from the interpretative acts of the reader rather than from the
author’s intentionality or from the form of the text itself, Professors Skover
and Collins locate the expressive meaning of the communication in the
interpretive act of its recipient. In this respect, they see no difference
between the expressive meaning of human and robotic speech.
Accordingly, they conclude that robotic communication addressed to
a human should be covered by the First Amendment because “for
constitutional purposes, what really matters is that the receiver experiences
robotic speech as a meaningful and potentially useful end value.”4 They
call such robotic speech intention-less free speech and buttress their
argument by noting how locating expressive meaning covered by the First
Amendment in the interpretive act of the recipient explains otherwise
inexplicable First Amendment doctrines regarding nonobscene
pornography, corporate commercial speech, and violent video game
speech.
Regarding robot-to-robot communications, Professors Skover and
Collins distinguish, at least implicitly, between those that are ultimately
addressed to humans and those that, while not addressed to humans, are
3. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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initiated by them. For a chain of robot communications ultimately
addressed to a human, they extend their earlier argument. Namely, a chain
of robot communications ultimately received by a human being is infused
within expressive meaning by that human recipient. And as such, the entire
transmission chain that generated that communication should be covered
by the First Amendment.
Now, for a chain of robot communications not ultimately addressed
and received by a human being but instead initiated by one, Professors
Skover and Collins argue that the robots act as proxies for that human
being, and so long as that person’s acts are for a lawful purpose, the chain
of robot communications warrants the same First Amendment coverage as
would that person’s—that human being’s—communications.
In making this argument, they claim that they are making explicit the
principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a
2011 case.5 Having concluded by considering those forms of robot
communication, that the First Amendment should cover robot
communications generally, Professors Skover and Collins ask: what is the
free speech protection that might be accorded to robotic expression?6 Now
that we know the First Amendment applies to robotic speech, they ask,
how much protection is robotic speech actually due?
While they do not offer a final answer to this question, they suggest
that the protection should be significant and begin the important work of
developing a framework for a full answer. Rather than developing yet
another message-centric, normative model of free speech protection that
attempts to distinguish speech that is worthy of protection from speech
that is not—and thereby ends up justifying the censorship of speech as
much as its protection—Professors Skover and Collins adopt a mediumcentric approach to First Amendment protection. They focus on robotic
communication as a new, disruptive technology and medium of
communication, the utility of which is so great that its robust protection is
inevitable. They offer two reasons for this conclusion.
First, they argue that the tremendous utility of robotic
communications alters the cost-benefit analysis traditionally applied in the
First Amendment context and that the value added by robotic
communication—in online shopping, booking travel, searching for goods,
information, and titillating content, as well as myriad other internet
services employing robots—is sufficiently great to cause us to tolerate
harms such as defamation, invasion of privacy, and pornography that, in
the past, we have used to justify curtailing the protection of non-robotic
speech.
5. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
6. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
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Second, they point out that the nature of the medium itself
undermines the efficacy of prior restraints no matter how those prior
restraints are justified, thus resulting in de facto nullification of any legal
command to restrain robotic speech. As a result, rather than robotic speech
being forced to conform to the existing norms of First Amendment
jurisprudence, they argue in good, realist fashion that those legal norms
will be forced to accommodate the functional realities of robotic speech.
Those are their arguments as to why robotic communication should
be covered by the First Amendment on one hand and why it will receive
robust protection on the other. So, having summarized the argument of the
first half of the book, we turn now to our panel and we will hear first from
Attorney Bruce Johnson. Take it away.
Johnson: My response to this argument was headlined “An Old
Libel Lawyer Confronts Robotica’s Brave New World.” I’m an old libel
lawyer. I’ve been practicing now for more than forty years, and I thought
what I was reading was kind of unusual from my perspective. I’ll explain
why. And also unusual, I think, from a First Amendment perspective. So,
I took issue.
The first point, and I guess these are the three large points, I want to
stress. The first point is while David and Ron focus on intention-less free
speech, in fact, in the law—and particularly the First Amendment law—
intentions matter for both good and for ill. And I’ll explain that this
actually goes all the way back to probably 1789 in the United States
Constitution drafting and extends as recently as New York Times v.
Sullivan,7 Westboro Baptist Church,8 cases like that. And the First
Amendment protections really do depend on good intentions versus bad
intentions. Related to that, the law has warriors out there looking for
liability, looking for cases, looking for payoffs. And as a consequence,
they will be looking for the bad intentions. You can’t divorce robotic
speech from the possibility that lawyers will be out there looking for a
payday and trying to find bad actors, and the bad actors will be trying to
insist that there is no payday because they are good actors. So, we are
going to live in a world with a lot of intentions, and that’s a world which
is very unusual for robots, obviously. It’s a human-centered world.
So, first of all, intentions matter. And that means I’m taking issue
with Ron and David’s utilitarianism. I don’t think utilitarianism is
something that is going to pass muster in a courtroom effectively because
it is basically a much larger concept: trying to weigh good speech versus
bad speech. In fact, the law basically creates a different kind of calculus,
similar to what we see in New York Times v. Sullivan, which is what kind
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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of intentions are behind this speech. Is it a lie or is it not a lie? Is it
something where we want to encourage it or is it something we want to
discourage?
Number two: Ron and David’s book doesn’t really deal with a
concept called “public concern speech.” In my libel work, I can tell you
that the difference between speech on a matter of public concern and
speech which is not on a matter of public concern is basically the
difference between night and day. Public concern speech gives rise to a
series of rules that are inherent, obviously in the defamation context, but
we also saw it in the Jerry Falwell case9 in the U.S. Supreme Court that
even if you recast your torts as some kind of intentional interference claim,
New York Times v. Sullivan will still apply.10
We saw it in the Westboro Baptist Church case, Snyder v. Phelps,
several years ago in the U.S. Supreme Court.11 An intentional infliction of
pain on people, basically on the families of soldiers who were being
buried, by this anti-gay church. I don’t want to call it a church, more of a
cult.12 And the Court basically said, yes, we’re going to allow that speech
to basically be permitted,13 in part, because it’s speech on a matter of
public concern.14 We fought it briefly there in that case where we argued
that the Westboro Baptist Church was like Elmer Gantry15—they have a
right to basically go out and make fools of themselves—but that speech on
what they considered to be religious was something that the Court and a
jury should not touch.
So, that public concern aspect is something which is, by definition or
not, not addressed by David and Ron, and I think it’s a key ingredient in
distinguishing speech for which liability can attach and speech for which
liability does not attach. The conversant situation where there is no public
concern is what I call the Dun & Bradstreet case,16 from about thirty years
ago. This was a credit report and it went to the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the question was whether a libel claim would lie under basically New York
Times v. Sullivan principles. And the U.S. Supreme Court said this is
nothing that involves a matter of public concern; therefore, we are not
going to touch it at all.17 And basically, it left the liability claim governed

9. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
10. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
11. Snyder, 562 U.S. 443.
12. See id. at 448–50.
13. See id. at 458.
14. Id.
15. SINCLAIR LEWIS, ELMER GANTRY (1927).
16. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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by English common law,18 which, if you know anything about English
common law, libel at that time was basically strict liability. And therefore,
no First Amendment claim would attach.
So, I think it’s important to distinguish between public interest
speech and non-public interest speech, and at least the dialectic as I hear it
from Ron and David doesn’t. I think that’s an important consideration.
The third thing: it’s really hard to deal with robotic speech without
dealing with articles that appear. For example, this one, two days ago, in
The Washington Post: “Russia Used Mainstream Media to Manipulate
American Voters.”19 This was two days ago in The Washington Post. Of
course, yesterday, February 16th, we saw the indictments issued by the
Mueller investigation dealing with the Russian attempts to use robotic
speech to affect the American political system with toxic views to
influence the course of the 2016 election. I don’t think you can separate
robotic speech from the problems we saw in 2016. As a practical matter,
the politicians will be dealing with that in one form or another for years to
come.
It’s interesting to me, when I grew up, I remember the inability to get
information directly from foreign countries. I actually remember one day
we were staying in Kalaloch on the beach on the Olympic coast, which got
no telephone reception, no radio reception at all. So, I brought a shortwave
radio with me—this was in 1991—because I could get Radio Moscow, and
they had great music on Radio Moscow. This was August 1991. I can
remember it very clearly. I was hearing this really odd music. It was the
kind of music you heard when they were deposing Khrushchev and
deposing Brezhnev, or at least moving Brezhnev out. It was almost
funereal, and I said there has been a change of government in Moscow.
And everybody looked at me silly. You know, we’re on the Olympic coast
beach. So, I went to Voice of America. Nothing. I went to BBC. Nothing.
I was the only person in the United States who actually knew that there
had been a coup in the Soviet Union, against Gorbachev. That’s how
unusual it was for international speech to be able to connect directly from
something in Moscow and receive news directly from the Russians.
Today, on the internet, as we saw yesterday and with yesterday’s
indictments from the Mueller investigation, we are now getting this stuff
pushing directly into the political bloodstream of America—directly from
the troll factory in St. Petersburg. And I don’t think the American political
18. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760–63.
19. Craig Timberg, Russia Used Mainstream Media to Manipulate American Votes, WASH. POST
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/russia-used-mainstreammedia-to-manipulate-american-voters/2018/02/15/85f7914e-11a7-11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.
html?utm_term=.98327f89f9f2.
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system has yet figured out how to deal with this—much less the American
legal system—when and if somebody can be found to be blamed. So, I just
want to highlight that, when you talk about robotic speech, we are going
to have to talk about the 2016 election eventually.
So, anyway, the first point I took issue with was the strict utilitarian
calculus. You can go back all the way to the initial arguments by
Alexander Hamilton in the Croswell case in 1803.20 Basically, defending
a Federalist editor from a Jeffersonian prosecution, Hamilton basically
argued that there should be protections available for anybody’s right to
publish “with impunity, truth with motives and for justifiable ends.”21
That’s what Alexander Hamilton argued to the New York Court of
Appeals in the Harry Croswell case.22 He lost.23 Actually, there was a
three-to-three tie and, therefore, the lower court judgment was affirmed.24
But with his death a year later, this statute became embodied in virtually
every state constitution or every state law allowing that there should be
protections available for people with good motives. In other words, we’ve
been basically working since at least 1803 against the strict liability system
that I think is inherent of the utilitarian calculus that David and Ron have
argued about.
And that persists today, in the Schenck25 case where we developed
the “clear and present danger test,” the Brandenburg26 case in 1960 when
we developed the notion that certain types of intention should not
necessarily lead to liability for attempts to overthrow the government.
Basically, that was an Ohio law that had a strict liability for advocacy of
violence. To Justice Brennan’s endorsement in New York Times v.
Sullivan27 of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open protections and the actual
malice rule in favor of public interest speech, basically, for good or for ill,
we have intentions built into our law dramatically, and even with the
onrush of robotic speech, I don’t expect that we’re going to be able to get
rid of that in favor of intention-less free speech.
The other thing to bear in mind is, I think, there’s going to be this
notion that abuse is inherent in what will be found liable under our legal
system. That is simply the way the American legal system works. And it’s
going to be unusual to figure out how our system will deal with it. My
view is that we’re going to have a very robust protection for computer
20. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804).
21. Id. at 352.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 394.
24. Id.
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
26. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
27. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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speech, which is not public interest-oriented. A few months ago, a joke
circulated about Jeff Bezos: “Alexa, get me something on Whole Foods.”
And the response: “Buying Whole Foods.” It would be interesting to
imagine Jeff Bezos sort of made that comment one day and then bingo.
Anyway, non-public interest speech will be absolutely protected. It will be
basically an area where people will be very comfortable. The law will very
easily regulate that type of speech. But in matters of public interest, in
matters of public concern, the First Amendment doctrine is much more
stringent and would likely block any such regulation.
For example, the bots that influenced our election in 2016. A series
of “disinformation bots,” they are called, I think you are going to see a
difficulty in the ability to regulate falsity that deals with public matters.
There are a number of cases that have already come through the court
system. The most recent one, which is cited in my materials in their book,
is the Susan B. Anthony case, Susan B. Anthony v. Kim, a Sixth Circuit
case where the state of Ohio sought to regulate false campaign speech and
the court in the Sixth Circuit said, you can’t. You simply have no ability
to regulate false campaign speech.28
We have a similar holding here in the state of Washington dealing
with our public disclosure commission. So, in fact, the further along you
go on the continuum of public interest, the higher you are in terms of
public interest speech and the less likely it will be that government can
influence it. Therefore, we will have what I wrote in the materials: a
tsunami of botnet speech in all of our election campaigns to come without
any serious ability to regulate it. And, as I concluded, I said, “This will not
be Mr. Rogers’s neighborhood anymore. And in fact, in American
campaign speech the death of discourse is clearly upon us.” In other words,
we’re a dystopian view. Thank you.
Silverman: Thank you very much, Attorney Johnson. And now we
have Professor Norton.
Norton: Good morning and thanks so much for sharing your
morning with us. And thanks to Law Review for inviting me. I appreciate
the graciousness of Maia, Brendan, and Mylla. I actually grew up in Seattle
and I don’t get back very often. So, I appreciate the chance to come back
even for a day, a day like today. It brings back fond memories of a very
happy childhood. So, thanks for that.
I’m not a technologist. I’m a constitutional lawyer, scholar, and
teacher. I know very little about technology, and I’m often uncomfortable
with it. But I’ve been interested in studying, along with my co-authors, if
you take a look at artificial intelligence or robotic speech, whatever you
28. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334 (2014).
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want to call it, what that tells us about free speech law and doctrine. In
other words, we get the hard problem of new and unusual speakers. What
does that tell us about why we protect speech or why we shouldn’t protect
speech?
So, in earlier work, first with my co-author Toni Massaro from the
University of Arizona29 and then a follow-up piece with Toni and my
current colleague Margot Kaminski, we concluded, similarly to Ron and
David, that very little in the First Amendment law poses a barrier to the
coverage of robotic speech.30 And this conclusion feels counterintuitive to
many, but it has much more to do with the contemporary state of free
speech law doctrine than with the nature of robots or the nature of
technology.
So, for example, if you think about the positive free speech theories
underlying the First Amendment arguments for why we affirmatively
should protect speech, why is speech in the Constitution? Positive theories
say, well, it’s because speech provides us with good things. And the
positive theories, for the most part, focus on protecting expression because
it is thought to give listeners affirmative benefits in terms of facilitating a
democratic self-governance—affirmative benefits in terms of exposure to
new ideas and knowledge. This is the marketplace of ideas argument. And
affirmative benefits in terms of informing listeners’ own choices in their
own time.
And we also looked at negative free speech theory, which is the idea
that we don’t protect speech because it’s all that great; we protect speech
because the government is so darn scary. So, this argument here is an
argument that we protect speech to protect listeners from the government.
And here too, we can understand that contemporary free speech law and
doctrine, whether it takes a positive or negative focus, is primarily
interested in what this means for listeners. Are they getting the positive
benefits they deserve? Are they being protected from the dangers of
government?
So, we concluded that free speech law and theory protects listeners’
interests and free speech outputs rather than speakers’ humanness or
humanity in ways that make it very difficult to place robots or artificial
intelligence speakers beyond the First Amendment speech. Ron and David
have reached similar conclusions in their terrific book, Robotica.31 One
measure of a quality book is that you find yourself thinking about it long
after you have read it, and that is true for me. I read their manuscript early
29. Massaro & Norton, supra note 2.
30. Toni M. Massaro et al., SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017).
31. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
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last summer, and I still think about it. So, thank you for that. And they too
conclude, as both a descriptive matter and a normative matter, that we
protect speech because of its affirmative value to listeners, and they define
that value very broadly as listeners’ utility. Speech is valuable to listeners.
It is of utility to listeners when it makes our lives easier or more
pleasurable, more entertaining, and more possible.
So far, I’m in complete agreement with David and Ron that the First
Amendment, at least today, is largely, if not entirely, about serving
listeners’ interests in speech. It’s listeners all the way down. So, what I
might talk about for the next few minutes is ask you, what does a listenercentered approach to robotic speech mean? And I’m going to very briefly
discuss the complicated and sometimes even dark side of robotic speech
from a listener-centered perspective, if we take listeners seriously.
A number of the folks who have spoken already have used the word
disruption or disruptive, and I like that very much. I think the Dean talked
about how some of these changes in technology are going to be disrupting
industry. I certainly agree. I feel—and I think David does too—that the
changes in technology that we’re seeing are going to disrupt also First
Amendment doctrine. I don’t know how, but I think it is inevitable. And
actually, Bruce gave you some examples of why this is the case, and I will
continue on those. I am not going to solve the problem of how First
Amendment doctrine should respond to these challenges. I’m going to
worry about it and I’m going to complain about it a little bit, and I’m going
to ask David hopefully to solve it. He’s an expert. But I just want to
introduce the concept here.
Now, cheap and plentiful speech is often of great utility to listeners.
The more speech the better for listeners, usually—not always, but usually.
Robotic speech is one of many examples of a source of cheap and plentiful
speech. So, from one point of view, robotic speech and other cheap and
plentiful speech is the ultimate in listener utility. But there is a dark side,
as cheap and plentiful speech can pose new dangers either to some
individual listeners or to the collective public. I will cite some recent
thoughtful commentaries on this.
Rick Hasen, for example, tells us that cheap speech has dramatically
lowered costs for those who want to draw upon people’s fears and rile
them up for violent purposes.32 Tim Wu says that it is no longer speech
itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners. Emerging threats to
public discourse take advantage of this change. The low costs of speaking
have made it easier to weaponize speech as a tool of speech control. The
unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may be used to attack, harass, and
32. Richard Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017598.
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silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate.33 Mark Verstraete and
Derek Bambauer use a more flattering term than cheap speech.34 They call
this democratization of the information system. Then they go on to say
that this transformation is not at all and in any way good. Facebook’s goal
is not the production of truth but rather the generation of increased traffic
interaction by users. Falsity can be profitable if it is popular, and falsity is
often popular. The new architecture of network information has a
structurally corrosive effect. It is easier to generate doubt about narratives,
even those produced by previously tested sources, than it is to create
trusted content. Authors and distributors attract attention, which they
monetize by casting doubt.
And then finally, Julie Cohen uses the term “infoglut” to describe
this same dynamic: this era of cheap and plentiful speech fueled by robots
and other technology. She says, “Information abundance also enables new
types of power asymmetries that revolve around differential access to data
and to the ability to capture, store, and process it on a massive scale.”35
Different terms—cheap speech, the abundance of speech, the
democratization of information, infoglut—they are all describing
abundant speech of the sort that robots and other technological
developments make possible. And sometimes it is great for listeners, but
that is not always the case. I want to give you a few other examples.
Sometimes, powerful speakers weaponize cheap speech to threaten
listeners—for example, by exploiting their information and their power
advantages and thus increasing the likelihood and severity of the harms
that they can inflict on listeners. What do I mean by harms? Well, I’m
thinking in particular the harms of deception, manipulation, and coercion.
And powerful speakers’ motives for exploiting their listeners are many and
are complicated. Certainly, they include financial gain, political gain.
Sometimes they do it for their own self entertainment, sometimes because
they are interested in undermining the notion of truth itself in order to
undermine democratic institution as well.
I too, like Bruce, am worried about the recent problem of Russian bot
trolling, and I think it exemplifies the challenges, the dark side, of robotic
speech. As Nathaniel Persily says,

33. TIM WU, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? (2017),
https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim%20Wu%20Is%
20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D74-JMJ4].
34. MARK VERSTRAETE ET AL., U. OF ARIZ., IDENTIFYING AND COUNTERING FAKE NEWS
(2017), https://law.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/asset/document/fakenewsfinal_0.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BFE5-64A8].
35. Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEO. INQ. L. 369, 384
(2016).
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Bots can serve many purposes, some beneficent and others
nefarious . . . . Of greatest relevance here, bots can spread
information or misinformation, and can cause topics to “trend” online
through the automated promotion of hashtags, stories, and the like.
During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in spreading
propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.36

Tim Wu points to China as another example of a powerful speaker
taking advantage of the cheap and abundant speech made possible by
robots and other technology to threaten listeners’ interests, and there he
describes what China has in place. The Chinese government has in place
a regime less intent on stamping out forbidden content, but it is instead
focused on distraction, cheerleading, and preventing meaningful collective
action. This is another example of what Julie Cohen called infoglut: we
will disempower listeners by flooding them with information. So, speakers
are a threat to listeners.
Second, sometimes listeners themselves use cheap and abundant
speech of the sort that robots make possible to threaten other listeners’
utility. And again, I agree with David and Ron that listeners are the focus
of most contemporary free speech law and doctrine, but listeners of course
themselves are neither monolithic nor homogenous. So, listeners’ interests
themselves, both short- and long-term, are often in conflict. Think of
trolling, for example. Whitney Phillips explains that trolls take perverse
joy in ruining a complete stranger’s day.37 They will do and say absolutely
anything to accomplish this objective and, in the service of these nefarious
ends, deliberately target the most vulnerable—or, as the trolls would say,
exploitable targets. So, the trolls’ listeners include their targets, the targets
of the troll. And certainly the targets of the troll don’t find that speech to
be of utility enough and find it to be of great harm. But some of the trolls’
listeners include other members of the trolling community who derive
pleasure and excitement—and again, I’m using her terms—watching
others ruin a complete stranger’s day. In other words, these listeners find
trolling to be enjoyable, of utility precisely because others find it so
unpleasant. They find it enjoyable to watch and listen to that happen.
Relatedly, different listeners experience hate speech in different
ways and disagree about its utility. Again, anonymous hate speech is of no
utility to the targets of hate speech, but many bystanders enjoy it under our
capacious understanding of utility. In returning to our earlier discussion of
36. Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, J. DEM., Apr. 2017, at 63, 70,
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/07_28.2_Persily%20%28web%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KU9L-X2Z9].
37. WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE NICE THINGS: MAPPING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND MAINSTREAM CULTURE 10 (2016).
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how some speakers exploit cheap speech to undermine democratic
institutions, again, some listeners enjoy such speech when it speaks to and
confirms their own preferences, their own intuitions, their own fears, their
own skepticisms. Lots of us like to listen to and read what’s outrageous,
and lots of us like to listen to and read stuff that confirms rather than
challenges our preexisting intuitions. So, in other words, the utility of this
sort of cheap and abundant speech made possible by robots and other
technology is contestable. The utility of speakers and listeners may be in
tension, and listeners themselves may disagree about the utility of
contested speech. There are winners and losers here.
So far, I have been characterizing this as the dark side of listener
utility in the context of robotic speech, but I’m going to try to turn to a
more affirmative or positive frame. And I just want to spend a minute or
two on what it would mean to protect and, thus, take listeners’ interests
seriously in the context of robotic and other technologically cheap speech.
And I think that a truly listener-centered approach, if it is listeners all the
way down, sometimes supports the regulation as well as the protection of
speech to protect listeners’ interests. And we have some precedent for this
in the context of commercial speech, professional speech, and maybe
employer speech.
The First Amendment is sometimes interpreted to commit
government to regulate that speech to serve listeners’ First Amendment
interest. And doctrinal adjustments in those other contexts include, for
example, requiring some speakers—like commercial speakers—not to lie,
requiring some speakers—even in the campaign context—to verbally
disclose their source because listeners find that knowing the source or the
origin of speech is so helpful to them in trying to figure out the quality or
credibility of that speech. In other words, in some other contexts that we
might understand as listener-centered contexts, the courts have said: if we
have to choose between speakers and listeners in this context, we choose
listeners. Why? Maybe because speakers are exploiting information or
power dynamics, but the doctrinal move there in that context sometimes is
that government imposes duties of honesty, imposes duties of accuracy,
and imposes duties of disclosure on comparatively powerful and
knowledgeable speakers in order to protect listeners.
So, in the same way, we might conclude that government should be
allowed under the First Amendment to regulate robotic speech, sometimes
on the basis of content to privilege human listeners’ interests and informed
choices or in avoiding certain harms, like the harms of coercion, deception,
and discrimination. In other words, free speech protection for robotic
speakers does not rob the First Amendment of the human focus so long as
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our understanding of the First Amendment attends to both the value and
danger of robotic speech.
Now, how to actually do that as a doctrinal matter is the hard
question. It’s just the disruption question that I stated earlier. It’s one that
we’re going to be grappling with for years to come. And for sure,
sometimes the answer may not be legal regulation. Right? Sometimes we
may prefer market, norms, or architecture as a better approach to
protecting listeners’ interests.
To close with one specific doctrinal possibility: I suggest that First
Amendment law absolutely positively could and probably should support
regulation that requires the disclosure of the source of speech as robotic if
it is in fact robotic. Again, the source or origin of speech is extremely
valuable information to listeners. Listeners rely on the source of speech as
a heuristic, as a proxy for expression’s quality and credibility. It’s true,
sometimes speakers prefer to be anonymous, sometimes anonymity is in
speakers’ interest for all sorts of reasons. On occasion, we might find those
reasons compelling, for example, when the speaker is a whistle-blower and
is otherwise vulnerable to coercion. But for the most part, speakers who
seek to hide their true identity from listeners are doing so because they are
trying to exploit or manipulate listeners.
So, disclosing and requiring the disclosure of the origin of the speech
I think is appropriate if you truly do take a listener-centered approach to
the First Amendment. In fact, precisely for that reason, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly upheld government regulations that require disclosures in a
campaign speech context. They require disclosure of the source of certain
campaign contributions or communications. Why? Because that
information is so important to listeners. And they uphold those disclosures
in a context—the campaign speech context—where, of course, otherwise
they are very loath to permit government regulation.
So, I acknowledge that identifying the threats that robotic speech
may impose to listeners’ interests is much easier than resolving or
responding to those threats in a satisfactory way. And my point is simply
that celebrating listener utility—and there is plenty to celebrate and I very
much appreciate David and Ron’s contribution to that—but my point is
that celebrating has a dark side of its own and it creates some problems
even while it solves others.
Silverman: Great. David, your responses now.
Skover: First, I am deeply indebted to my colleagues and friends
Bruce Johnson and Helen Norton, first for their participation as
commentators in my book co-authored with Ron Collins called Robotica:
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Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence.38 Their challenging and very
astute commentaries were published in the second half of the work, along
with the fine introductory piece for the book authored by your keynoter
today, Ryan Calo.39 Those commentaries deserve to be read in full. I hope
that you will do so when Robotica finally appears in print in May or June
of this year. And this will be my last commercial advertising ploy for the
day.
I also am grateful to them for agreeing to discourse with me today as
panelists, thus foreshadowing for you some of the most salient points of
contention that they take in their soon-to-be-published commentaries.
Finally, my thanks to Greg Silverman, my colleague at the law school for
agreeing to read Robotica, in manuscript form no less, and to moderate
this panel today.
To begin, I remind you all that a robust exchange of ideas is one of
the most revered aspirations for the First Amendment. And in that spirit, I
am very fortunate to have the informed engagement of such thoughtful
individuals as Ryan, Bruce, and Helen. Of course, on some points I differ
from my colleagues. But hearty intellectual rough-and-tumble is not only
true to free speech principles, but it also expands the borders of our
thinking. And it can be just darn fun.
Before directly addressing Bruce and Helen’s arguments, there are a
few important matters which I call tenets that I wish to mention so as to
clarify your understanding of Robotica’s larger purposes and themes and
to set their critiques in perspective.
Tenet I: On Technology and Theory. Robotica does not offer a new
and generalized theory of free speech.40 The principal aim of the book is
to address the relationship between robotic technologies and the First
Amendment, and to demonstrate how robotic expression stands to
reconfigure free speech theory.41 Accordingly, Part One of the book
delivers, in Ryan Calo’s words, “an historical tour of communications,
technologies, the transition from oral to written language, the invention of
a printing press, and the arrival of the electronic communications finally
arriving at the age of robotics.”42
In all of this, Ron and I highlighted several takeaway points—some
of which Greg mentioned, but all of which merit reinforcement:

38. See COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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No communication technology is likely to overtake its
predecessor unless its utility, however defined, is great. Thus, for
example, printed books, including the Gutenberg Bible, eclipse
scripted documents because of their greater cost effectiveness
and their functionality.



When utility is great, a new communications technology
promotes values that may well override the values of its
predecessor, including political and moral ones. To continue my
religious example, the printing press enabled the Protestant
Reformation, challenging the religious stranglehold of the
Catholic Church in Western Europe.



Governmental censorship is likely to push back against new
communications technologies in the interest of preserving old
values. Thus, the Catholic Church censored heretical books,
controlled printing presses, and persecuted heretics.



When its utility is substantial, a new communications technology
can override censorial efforts. Thus, despite the Church’s Index
of Forbidden Books and its Inquisition, the religious and
nonreligious book industry grew and thrived.



And in all of this, the link between the mode of communication
and its utility is the driving force for free speech protection,
either legally or functionally. Accordingly, the First Amendment
explicitly forbids religious establishments, protects the freedom
of religious thought and practices, and safeguards the press.

So, you see, the main purpose of this book, again, is not to deliver a
new general theory of the First Amendment, but to explore the connection
between robotic technologies and technologies of the past and censorial
governmental efforts.43
Tenet II: The Coverage versus Protection Distinction. Central to
Robotica is a distinction, which Greg did mention, between those speech
activities that might be covered by the First Amendment as distinguished
from those that are to be protected by the First Amendment.44
In Part Two of the book, Ron and I present a theory of when a claim
of First Amendment coverage can be made, which we call “intention-less
free speech” (IFS).45 We argue that when a reasonable receiver
understands a transmission of information to be a meaningful expression,
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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then First Amendment coverage exists. In other words, unless the receiver
finds some expression meaningful, the transmission will not be deemed
speech at all. Only if a robotic transmission satisfies the IFS standard will
First Amendment protection analysis come into play.
Part Three of the book then proposes that protection may be
determined by a contextualized evaluation of the utility secured and
disutility or harm incurred by the robotic expression in question.46 At that
point, the norm of utility operates as a justification for First Amendment
protection. Whether utilities are offset by governmental demonstrations of
harm will ultimately determine whether the robotic expression is given
First Amendment protection. Speech will not eat the world under a maxim
of utility because speech is not to be determined by utility but rather by
IFS, the intention-less free speech standard. And protected speech is not
to be determined by utility alone but rather by evaluation of competing
utilities and harms.
Tenet III: On Utility—A Conceptual Framework for Protecting
Robotic Speech. In order to clear away some analytical brush, it may be
useful to stress what our utility norm is not.
It is not exclusionary. Our utility norm can work in tandem with other
First Amendment normative values as long as they reinforce one another.
This is, in a sense, a partial response to Bruce, who is concerned about our
norm of utility and our standard of intention-less free speech as ignoring
intentions. Other norms that safeguard intentions can still operate in
tandem with utility. We would say the likelihood is that utility will take
over when those other norms conflict with it.
Our utility norm is not hypocritical. It aims to avoid the hypocrisy of
many writers in the First Amendment arena who stretch Enlightenment
theories—everything from the search for truth to self-governance—almost
to the breaking point in order to protect outlier forms of expression,
including robotic expression.
Our norm of utility is not synonymous with other First Amendment
principles. It should not be understood to collapse into other normative
value theories. A robotic expression that serves even private interests, as
contrasted with public ones, might be protected in the absence of any
significant competing harms.
Bruce seems to be somewhat unmindful of this point when he
critiques Ron and me for failure to address the bedrock principle providing
First Amendment heightened protection to speech relating to matters of
public concern. I offer several responses. First, public concern is not an
inquiry that is relevant to First Amendment coverage for robotic
46. Id.
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expression under our IFS theory. It only becomes relevant under our utility
calculus for First Amendment protection. The more robotic expression is
useful for the general public, the more protectable it may be; or the more
the public interest is harmed, the less protectable it might be.
Second, notions of public interest might already be subsumed within
the utility calculus. This resonates with my earlier observation that the
utility norm is not exclusionary but may work in tandem with other First
Amendment normative values.
Third, public interest is sometimes defined vis-à-vis other First
Amendment norms, such as Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory of selfgovernance. The Supreme Court suggested as much in Garrison v.
Louisiana when it equated speech concerning public affairs with “the
essence of self-governance.”47 To the extent this occurs, public interest
analysis may dilute the utility norm and thereby diminish First
Amendment protection.
Fourth, as Bruce explicitly concedes in his written commentary
(though he did not mention it today), public interest is an unruly norm
inviting confusion.48 Indeed, some of Professor Norton’s line-drawing
concerns would be equally applicable to the public interest analysis that
Bruce touts.
Fifth, given the aegis of the First Amendment, the public interest in
robotic communication technologies may well be defined primarily as the
maximization of the free flow of digitized information, ideas, and
opinions.
Sixth, insofar as our utility norm may invite the Huxleyan dystopia
that Bruce suggests, the same could be said of existing First Amendment
doctrines. That was a larger message of Ron’s and my first book together,
The Death of Discourse.49 Apparently, Bruce forgot that we first coined
that term. And though I am largely sympathetic to Bruce’s fears of political
and cultural pollution, a governmental cure to such a problem can itself be
viewed as a form of Orwellian tyranny.
Finally, the utility norm is not canonical. Like all other theories, the
utility norm must have some play in the joints in order to be effective.
Because of that play, there will necessarily be hard questions of line
drawing. Moreover, Robotica offers only a few pages to considerations of
First Amendment protection, furnishing only a preliminary setting of
generalized principles for analysis rather than a treatise-like framework for
deciding specific issues of protection.50 Even though she is truly mindful
47. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
48. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
49. RONALD L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2d ed. 2005).
50. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
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of this point, Helen is nonetheless troubled by the hard line-drawing
problems that “the dark side” of utility imposes. It bears emphasizing,
however, that there are some meaningful limitations built into the robotic
free speech proposal. In addition to the intention-less free speech threshold
that I earlier described for coverage, there is the harm principle. In other
words, evaluation of one person’s utility and another person’s disutility
and harms are all part of the calculus of First Amendment protection. And
the precise point at which the line is drawn is often far too contextualized
to be determined a priori.
Of course, the idea of rights in conflict is nothing new to the First
Amendment. Indeed, it is commonplace; but not all rights or interests are
created equal. Put into our context, one person’s utilities may be more
functional and less harmful to society than another person’s. And if so, the
First Amendment utility norm supplemented by other doctrines such as
content discrimination, vagueness, substantial overbreadth, etcetera, may
point to enhanced protection. Given the nature of robotic expression, its
mind-boggling speed, and its wide range and reach, some legal tests might
need to be rethought. Brandenburg’s incitement standard, for example,
might be reconfigured given the instantaneous speed and wide-ranging
reach of robotic expression.51 The Brandenburg imminence test might be
revised with much more emphasis on the “likely to produce action” prong.
All of this may call for a technological fix rather than a regulatory one.
Which leads me to my last tenet.
Tenet IV: On Functional Fixes.52 First Amendment law typically
disfavors regulatory responses when private sector technology can be
fixed. In First Amendment law, this is called a less restrictive means. This
occurs when technological fixes are both reasonably available and
adequate. Such may be the case with robotic technologies that have the
capacity to outstrip the pragmatic potential of regulatory responses. When
Helen and Bruce bemoan, as they do in their written commentaries, a
dissemination of fake news by robot trolls or bots, this tenet on
technological fixes takes on enhanced force.53
On the one hand, false statements or misinformation about private
individuals or commercial products are already regulated by numerous
federal and state consumer protection and defamation laws. On the other
hand, the problem is much more complicated, as Bruce noted, when the
fake news occurs in the public arena. If nefarious groups deploy trolls or
bots in order to spread misinformation there, it may be incumbent on

51. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
52. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
53. Id.
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opposing groups to respond in technological kind and employ anti-trolls
to correct the record with more truthful information.
When Bruce decries the destruction of democratic discourse by
robots that completely escape governmental control, Ron and I cry out for
robotic fixes that trump the potential of regulatory responses alone.54
As one of the authors of The Death of Discourse, I greatly
sympathize with Bruce’s angst over the electronic pollution of enlightened
and rational political discourse.55 Our cultural critique in The Death of
Discourse notwithstanding, as a legal matter, we nod to arguments against
governmental monitoring of bot-generated political falsehoods.56 Of
course, falsehoods have been long purveyed by human agents of political
campaigns using earlier technologies. Only consider William Randolph
Hearst’s notorious manipulation of print news in order to fuel public fury
and fervor for the Spanish–American War of 1898. Radio and television
ushered in an era of even more widespread political misinformation than
the printing press ever provided. Surely, the First Amendment would
prevent the government from censoring false political speech on those
technologies. That should arguably be so regardless of the technology.
Notably, the technological fix is an instantiation of Justice Louis
Brandeis’s First Amendment maxim that the answer to false speech is not
censorship but counter-speech.
Even if entities spend huge amounts of time and money to influence
and manufacture our preferences, as Helen lamented in her written
commentary,57 should we admit to government regulation of political
campaigns? Could this not be a stark example of governmental
paternalism run amok? Ours is a First Amendment that abhors a
governmental Ministry of Truth.
Evolution does not respect constitutions, customs, or creeds. It
washes over them like waves erode shorelines. What does that mean to us?
It means that we must approach robotic communication with a certain
open-mindedness, a preparedness to question our presuppositions and a
willingness to embrace, although guardedly, what seems inevitable. The
inevitable may not always synchronize well with today’s view of the law,
or even with today’s societal values associated with what it means to be
human and engage in communication. But in the end, it is well to recall
the sage advice of Francois-Marie Arouet Voltaire: Doubt is not a pleasant
condition, but certainty is an absurd one.

54. Id.
55. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 49.
56. See generally id.
57. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
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Once again, I thank my fellow panelists for their thorny and stirring
challenges to Robotica.58 Ron’s and my book is far better for their
critiques, and the same can surely be said of the discourse we’ve heard
today.
Silverman: Great. Thank you, David. So, now we have about fifteen
minutes for questions and answers. That means you, the audience, get to
pepper our panel with any questions you might have. And of course, we
can ask questions of one another as well. But I know we are running a little
long and so I want to jump right into Q&A with the audience. State your
name if you will.
Amanda: Hi, my name is Amanda. Thanks so much. I can try to
summarize the question. My background is working in data visualization
and big data, and for the past five years, I have been working to sell things
at Wal-Mart and have viewed that world. And so, when we talk about
intentionality, it’s really towards everyone, but I see this more when this
is leveraged to your example, “Alexa, buy something from Whole Foods.”
I don’t see it as just person-to-person, robot-to-person; this comes from
somewhere. It’s coming from a human somewhere. It’s Google, it’s
Facebook. And at the very least, even if we are not extremely skeptical—
I happen to be very skeptical, but even if we’re not—we want to sell
products, services. Do any of you have a comment about that? About the
way that the intentionality is to push something, to sell or at least to keep
us online, to keep us on Facebook. Just, again, if you have some thoughts
on that. It’s an enormously broad question.
Johnson: I actually co-authored a treatise on commercial speech that
basically takes issue with the notion that commercial intentions are
suspect.59 I actually think commercial speech is probably among the safest
speech around because you are going to find out pretty early on whether
you have a bad product or not. That doesn’t happen in the political world,
unfortunately. It may take a year, two years, three years, or four years, but
you may have disastrous results in the meantime. So, in a sense, I don’t
distrust the notion that somebody wants to sell me something. On the other
hand, you are right: big data is a danger. There are forces that are very
powerful in terms of pushing technology on us. The social media situation
is, to my mind, fraught with all sorts of risk about how much access we
have to it versus how much access is being manipulated by other forces
than us. So, I see a risk there. On the other hand, if you grew up in a world
of four broadcast networks, or three broadcast networks, this is very
familiar to us. This is a much more limited space of large speakers
58. Id.
59. STEVEN G. BRODY & BRUCE E. H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A
FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE (2017).
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controlling the way we communicate. Broadcast’s role in 1960 was not
that different from what we’re dealing with in terms of the technology
world in 2018.
Amanda: I guess not just a question of service and product, the fact
that they know every single thing about me. I work at Target; they
advertise it. They know your age, your income, your political views, and
the way they swing that it is more than that. Are there concerns around it?
That’s more it.
Skover: I think we’re going to see that with the Mueller investigation
because if there were actually efforts to communicate between the
Russians and the Trump campaign or Cambridge Analytica in terms of
whom to target with the misinformation, we will be seeing some very
significant discussions about that point. Let me just address your question
from another angle, and that is from the perspective of First Amendment
protection. When in Virginia Pharmacy in 1976 the Supreme Court first
gave serious First Amendment protection to commercial speech,60 it did
so in a way that Ron’s and my book called a vindication of the intentionless free speech coverage theory.61 It did so by saying that the important
value in the commercial communication is not the intentions of the
speaker. The Court assumed that every corporate speaker intended to sell
a product, but it said that what was important was the listeners, i.e., the
consumers—that is, what they received as information and how it might
affect their decisions to purchase in the marketplace.
So, from a First Amendment standpoint, your concerns have been
rendered almost irrelevant—not entirely irrelevant—but that is not the
focus of First Amendment protection. First Amendment protection is
based on a reception theory or the reader response theory that Ron and I
relied on in our book. It is the meaning of the information to the consumer
that the Court valued for granting First Amendment protection to
commercial speech.
Howard: My name is Howard Chizeck. I’m going to push on
Amanda’s question a little bit more. Right now, should companies
involved with Alexa or Siri, possibly Cortana, learn things about you from
the discourse? For example, by watching your response and voice tone and
stress patterns in response to comments and images, your sexual
orientation can be determined with high accuracy, as can your political
leanings as well as information that is available in databases about your
network and your buying patterns. So, it seems that the discourse that is
going on is not just to sell and to acquire information about you, which can
60. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
760–73 (1976).
61. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 1.
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then be sold to other companies. And that is not necessarily in the
expectation of the user. And yet it is commercial free speech. So, I’m
wondering how that fits in to your First Amendment analysis and other
related privacy issues legally.
Norton: Yeah, I’ll take that. Thank you both of you. I agree and share
your concern. If you go back to the emergence of the contemporary
commercial speech doctrine in the 1970s, it was transparently listenerfocused. Meaning commercial speech is not protected when it is false,
misleading, or related to illegal activity. Why? Because listeners have no
interest in commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal
activity. And all other commercial speech, regulation of all other
commercial speech—truthful, non-misleading, non-illegal commercial
speech—receives intermediate scrutiny. Basically, the idea is that the
regulation should live or die based on whether or not the regulation serves
listeners’ interest. That was the 1970s statement on commercial speech.
And I think it’s very fair to wonder if that still describes how the
commercial speech doctrine is working today. If you think about the
Sorrell case, you think about some others, it seems like the Court today is
very, very comfortable striking down regulations of commercial-related
speech that were designed to protect listeners—for example, designed to
protect listeners’ privacy—in the name of protecting speech. That really
serves the commercial speakers’ interest. So, I think we started down the
right path with commercial speech doctrine, but I’m uncomfortable with
where we are currently. We have lost our focus on listeners’ interests.
Johnson: I’ll just add one word. Helen is quite right: characterizing
the change as the focus. But in the Sorrell case, the Supreme Court
essentially equated commercial speech with all other forms of speech
when it came to its content discrimination principle.62 That is the First
Amendment, right? It does not allow the government to discriminate on
the basis of content or viewpoint, at least without showing a serious
harm.63 And so, in the Sorrell case there was no, there really wasn’t any
evidence, any great evidence of harm involved with the sale of the
information, which was pharmaceutical purchases by customers.64 And
without a record of invariably provable harm, the content discrimination
that was on the face of the regulation there was deemed unconstitutional.65
Ruth: Hi, Ruth Atherton from the Gates Foundation. So, I’m very
interested in—and I think this is directed to Helen and David—I’m
interested in thinking about the Brandeis principle that more speech is the
62. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011).
63. Id. at 572.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 563–64, 572.
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solution. I’m interested in your thoughts about the use of the anti-troll
measures—which, I love this concept—as a way to correct speech, but in
light of the fact that cheap speech is such a lower threshold to produce than
evidence-based data. Can you both comment on that?
Skover: All right, I’ll take this first. Let me just point out that this
problem is not entirely endemic to robotic technology. We have the
problem you’re talking about with television—certainly since the age of
cable. My mother never watched any other station than Fox News. She
refused to watch any channel that did not confirm to her own biases—her
own views of the world. So, these phenomena preexisted robotics. What’s
important about the anti-troll or the anti-bot proposal is that it would be a
technological fix, not something that the government arranged, but that
some corporation might produce and purvey to those who want to hear the
other side of the argument. But that assumes a certain openness of mind.
That’s really the issue. In fact, part of the problem that Bruce is talking
about—the death of discourse—occurs in large part because, in this
information club that you talk about, many of us just simply cut out the
noise and focus entirely on what confirms our views of the world. In such
a scenario as that, we may not be getting the benefit of the anti-troll
proposal.
Norton: Yes, very quickly. I appreciate the question. I don’t know
the solution. I think once we acknowledge that cheap speech has value and
danger, in addressing the dangers, I am open to all solutions. I am open to
legal solutions, technological, etcetera. I don’t have the answer today. My
goal today is, because this worries me and keeps me up at night, I want
you all to be up at night too. But in terms of legal response, I do think that
we’ve lost our way. I think Sorrell—no doubt we disagree in this room
about Sorrell—I think Sorrell was a step away from the right direction.66
I think in terms of the history of hypocrisy—and another plug for David
and Ron’s book is that it’s a terrific history of technology and a terrific
history of hypocrisy that I found very compelling. But I think the Court’s
contemporary free speech doctrine in this area is in fact itself
hypocritically claiming to protect listeners’ interests when it’s really not.
It’s protecting powerful speakers’ interests.
Silverman: In the back? State your name.
Chris: It’s Chris. Do you see your anti-trolling technology as
something disseminating information?
Skover: Well, I’m not an engineer. I’m not a technologist. But I
would assume that it could be either. It depends entirely on the need that
is presented and how the technology is designed. I’m speaking completely
66. See generally id.
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off the cuff here, but arguably one could achieve somewhat of the same
result either way depending on what the information is. If I filter out
information entirely from foreign bots, I may be achieving the same result
as if I produce truthful information that counters the misinformation that
was purveyed during the 2016 elections. So, I would say: What’s the
difference if the end result is the elimination of foreign influence in our
elections?
Silverman: I think we have time for one more question. Ryan, did
you have a question earlier? You pass? Okay.
Mike: I’m Mike. I think I too am in favor of more information is
better. This goes by the technological fix, just kind of adding on. Given
the information asymmetries and access like the Russian government, for
example, I’m just wondering if you are going against foes that are putting
out this information that had that kind of access to the data, access the
technology and the know-how, how does that work in real life? I’m putting
too much on you.
Skover: Again, I’m not a techie. I’m not an engineer. But as I
understand the Russian problem, what would make it more difficult to
identify and limit the misinformation from a foreign bot is that the
information was coming through social media platforms with American
identities. The bots were identifying themselves and setting up accounts
as American citizens. So, I see how the news reports on the Russian
interference play into what you are talking about. I certainly don’t have a
technological answer for it at this point, but here I completely agree with
Helen on the matter of disclosure. I don’t think there is a First Amendment
problem, as a general matter, with the disclosure of bot-producing speech,
assuming we understand that the bot is “speaking” for itself.
Johnson: I actually agree with David that there is a technological
fix. When I wrote my materials about a year and a half ago, I hadn’t seen
evidence of this, but if you look at things like Hamilton 68 generated by
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, ironically, the Marshall
Fund was created by the United States government to restore Germany’s
democracy in 1947 and 1948, and the German Marshall Fund was created
to help, as it turns out now, America to sort of preserve its democracy. It
created a mechanism for finding out—I check every day—what the bots
are doing these days based upon the analysis done by Hamilton 68, which
was created by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. So, I can
figure out what level of speech is being pushed. A few weeks ago, it was
“release the memo.” So, I knew that the newest memo deal was one that
the Russian bots were very much behind, and that gave me a chance to
evaluate exactly what was going on in that particular activity. So, I think
we’re starting to develop these types of technological fixes. They are not
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perfect, but they are certainly better than government regulation, which,
as all of us will concede, is fairly generally ill-considered in this context.
Silverman: Well, I think that wraps up the panel.

